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LAW AND DISCRETION IN SUPREME COURT 
RECUSALS:  A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR 
LUBET 
Barry Sullivan* 
I would like to thank the organizers of this year’s Tabor Lecture in 
Legal Ethics for inviting me to participate in this timely, important, and 
very interesting discussion.  I would also like to thank Glenn Tabor for 
making this occasion possible.  Encouraging “reflection on the vocation 
and responsibilities of lawyers,” the purpose of this lecture series, is a 
worthy goal in any season, but particularly so today, when lawyers, the 
legal profession, and legal education face so many challenges.  Many of 
those challenges are economic, of course, but some go to the very idea of 
vocation, denying that there is anything to the work that we do, or the 
way we do it, apart from economic self-interest.  Those challenges 
antedate our current economic crisis, and I suspect that they will be with 
us long after economic recovery has taken hold.  Finally, I want to thank 
Professor Lubet for a wonderful paper.  It is thoughtful and thought 
provoking.  I learned much from it, and I am honored to have been 
asked to respond to it. 
I should say at the outset that I find myself in agreement with 
Professor Lubet on what I take to be his principal points.  First, the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, like all other judges, should be subject to 
an integrated code of conduct that details their ethical responsibilities 
with as much precision as the subject matter allows.  I think that the need 
for such a code is particularly compelling at the present time, when most 
of the Justices do not shun the limelight, as many of their predecessors 
did, but seem to savor celebrity and its trappings.  Second, I agree that 
the Court should institute a more effective mechanism for handling 
recusals—meaning a mechanism that encourages greater deliberation, 
consistency, and transparency in decision-making, gives appropriate 
weight to constitutional values in adjudication, facilitates objectively 
reasonable results, and promotes public confidence in the administration 
of justice. 
Like Professor Lubet, I find the Chief Justice’s arguments against 
such reforms to be unpersuasive.  To my mind, the Chief Justice’s 
                                                 
* Cooney & Conway Chair in Advocacy and Professor of Law, Loyola University 
Chicago; Arthur Cox Visiting Research Fellow and Visiting Professor, Trinity College, 
University of Dublin.  The author is grateful to Megan Canty, Alfred S. Konefsky, Margaret 
Moses, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Alexander Tsesis, and Michael Zimmer for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft and to Abraham Souza for excellent research assistance.  The 
author also gratefully acknowledges the generous assistance of John N. Jacob, Archivist of 
the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archive of Washington and Lee University. 
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arguments evidence a refusal to acknowledge the existence of a problem 
that clearly exists; they also give lie to the humility—and the realism—of 
Justice Robert H. Jackson’s famous dictum:  “We are not final because we 
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”1  In 
addition, I am sympathetic to the concerns underlying H.R. 862, the so-
called “Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act,” even though I 
have serious reservations about the specific approach taken in that draft 
legislation. While I agree that the Supreme Court needs a code of 
conduct, and a better way of dealing with recusals, whether raised on the 
motion of a party or by a Justice sua sponte (an important consideration 
because litigants and counsel may either lack knowledge as to arguable 
grounds for recusal or be reluctant to raise the issue), there are two 
points on which I would like to raise some questions.  First, what role, if 
any, should Congress have in solving these problems?  For example, can 
or should Congress require the Court to adopt a specific code of conduct, 
as H.R. 862 purports to do, or should it simply require that the Court 
adopt some code of conduct of its choosing?  Second, I have some 
question as to whether en banc consideration of recusal motions 
necessarily would provide the best solution to the problem.2  Given the 
Justices’ apparently longstanding reluctance to take the subject as 
seriously as it warrants, I question whether en banc consideration would 
necessarily lead to more deliberation or to better or more consistent 
results.  Might not the requirement of en banc consideration simply 
produce recusal determinations that are formally styled as constituting 
decisions “by the Court,” while actually being determinations that have 
been left, more or less, to the discretion of an individual Justice?  Might 
not this diffusion of responsibility result in even less accountability?  In 
addition, en banc consideration might not be conducive to the 
development of that sense of individual responsibility that is essential to 
the proper disposition of those cases in which possible grounds for 
recusal exist, but no motion has been filed, either because the putative 
movant is not aware of the relevant facts or because he or his lawyer 
believes that the potential costs or possibly negative repercussions of 
filing such a motion are too great. 
                                                 
1 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
2 Like Professor Lubet, I believe that the solution advanced by H.R. 862—transferring 
the recusal review authority from the Court to retired Justices or lower federal court 
judges—is too fraught with constitutional infirmities to warrant serious consideration.  
Steven Lubet, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks:  SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883, 894 (2013) (discussing potential problems with H.R. 862); 
cf. Kevin Hopkins, Supreme Court Leaks and Recusals:  A Response to Professor Steven Lubet’s 
“SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius,” 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 925 (2013) (providing a 
more positive assessment of H.R. 862). 
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In the first part of my remarks, I explain the basis for my general 
agreement with Professor Lubet.  In the second part, I discuss the 
reservations I have noted and make some suggestions of my own. 
I. 
My substantial agreement with Professor Lubet is based on what I 
take to be the minimum requirements of the rule of law and its 
application to the work of the Supreme Court.  In this context, I would 
suggest that adherence to the rule of law requires at least three things: 
first, judicial decisions should be rooted in articulable, pre-existing, and 
pre-announced legal principles; second, judicial decisions should be 
supported by fully reasoned, public explanations that are subject to 
public and professional scrutiny; and, third, judicial decisions should 
normally be made by judges who are impartial and disinterested, both in 
fact and in appearance.3  I say “normally” to acknowledge the existence, 
but not necessarily the relevance for present purposes, of the rule of 
necessity.  Of course, the first two requirements are related to each other 
in that reasoned explanations must refer back to pre-announced legal 
principles.4 
My central point is straightforward.  As Judge Charles M. Hough of 
the Second Circuit wrote almost a century ago, “[T]he legal mind must 
assign some reason in order to decide anything with spiritual quiet.”5  
                                                 
3 Impartiality does not require that Justices have no preexisting views as to the proper 
interpretation of the law:  “Bias in the sense of crystallized point of view about issues of 
law or policy is almost universally deemed no ground for disqualification.”  KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 245 (3d ed., 1972).  As Justice Rehnquist observed 
in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972), “Proof that a Justice’s mind . . . was a complete 
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of 
qualification, not lack of bias.”  Nonetheless, advocates know that their task is more 
difficult when a Justice has previously expressed strong (even if mistaken) views in 
deciding the same or related issues.  If a Justice has confirmed those views in extra curial 
speeches and writings, the task of persuasion may be even more difficult.  See Barry 
Sullivan, The Humanity of Advocacy, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. xxiii, xxx–xxxii (2010). 
4 That is not to say, of course, that the relevant legal principles are always obvious, that 
the governing principle is always self-evident, that legal reasoning is not constructive in 
nature, or that law is unchanging.  As Paul W. Kahn has suggested, “Belief in the rule of 
law shapes a range of possible outcomes; it is neither wholly determinate nor wholly 
indeterminate.”  PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:  RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 115 (1999).  Unlike other kinds of disputes, a legal dispute “begins with each 
side recognizing that the other has a position that can be defended through appeal to 
cognizable legal resources.  The issue is what does the law require, not what outcome will a 
decision maker favor.”  Id. 
5 U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 
1915), quoted in Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice:  An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. 
REV. 777, 797 (1981). 
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Reasons are the lifeblood of the law.  Even the most seasoned judges 
send back reports of “the opinion that won’t write.”  The judge will have 
read the briefs, studied the record, heard oral arguments, discussed the 
case with her clerks, and agreed on the proper outcome in conference 
with her fellow judges.  But when the time comes for writing the 
opinion, the judge finds that “the opinion won’t write”—the reasons 
needed to support the outcome that everyone agreed on are just not 
there.  The point can also be made by reflecting on the fact that many 
legal questions, including some of the most important, are not 
susceptible to any single, demonstrably correct answer.  But some 
answers are better than others.  What matters to “the legal mind” in 
search of “spiritual quiet” is not simply the practical attractions of an 
answer that may be offered, but the quality of the reasons that support 
one or another plausible resolution of the problem.  In either case, the 
persuasiveness of the reasons supporting the decision will depend, at 
least in part, on the degree of connection between the reasons assigned 
for the decision and the articulable, pre-existing, and pre-announced 
legal principles that are relevant to the decision.  It is in the effort to 
explain and justify our conclusions that we determine whether those 
conclusions are in fact explicable and justifiable.  As H. Jefferson Powell 
has argued, “Only when [the Justices’] opinions seek to persuade our 
judgments, not just coerce our wills, can the decisions of the Court truly 
be called authoritative.”6 
Perhaps naively, we are conditioned to think of the Supreme Court 
not only as an institution subject to the rule of law, but as one that 
embodies or symbolizes the rule of law.  Why, then, do the Justices 
refuse to formulate a code of ethics to govern their behavior, and thus 
decline to “say what the law is,”7 in Chief Justice Marshall’s famous 
phrase? Why do they also decline to give reasoned explanations for their 
recusal decisions, and thus refuse to tell the public how the law was 
actually applied? 
                                                 
6 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE:  THE MORAL DIMENSION OF 
JUDICIAL DECISION 109 (2008); see also JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH:  RESISTING THE 
EMPIRE OF FORCE 212 (2006) (“Although we live in a mass culture it is nonetheless possible 
for our leaders—in the judiciary, in the legislature, and in the White House—to speak as 
responsible human beings, explaining themselves in a kind of expression that does not 
trivialize them and us but does honor to both.  It is imaginable that in their expressions 
they could manifest minds that are honestly engaged in thought and expression of a deep 
and living kind, not the manipulation of formulas.”). 
7 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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One answer to these questions may be found, I think, in the 
historical evolution and current operations of the Supreme Court,8 and in 
a perhaps understandable tendency on the part of the Justices to confuse 
matters of law with matters of discretion.  When we idealize the Court as 
a symbol of the rule of law, we tend to forget that the Court has evolved 
into an institution that is mainly characterized by the exercise of 
absolute, unreviewable discretion; most of the decisions it makes are not 
decisions on the legal merits of cases, but determinations to grant or 
deny review.9  In earlier times, the Court decided the merits of all of the 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:  
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 389, 389 
(2004) (“Once a relatively passive institution which heard all appeals that Congress 
authorized, the Court is now a virtually autonomous decisionmaker with respect to the 
nature and extent of its own workload.”) (footnote omitted). 
9 What I mean by this, of course, is that numerically speaking virtually all the 
“decisions” made by the Court are decisions about whether to grant review—which 
present questions of discretion, rather than law.  The current version of Rule 10 of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court of the United States goes to great lengths in emphasizing the Court’s 
absolute discretion in deciding whether to grant review.  The introductory paragraph 
states: 
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion.  A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons.  The following, although neither controlling nor 
fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the 
reasons the Court considers[.] 
SUP. CT. R. 10.  Moreover, the denial of certiorari is not a decision on the merits and lacks 
precedential effect.  See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950) 
(Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).  As Margaret Moses has shown, the 
Court recently has chosen, with some frequency, and with or without calling for re-briefing 
or re-argument, to decide questions not presented by the parties.  See Margaret L. Moses, 
Beyond Judicial Activism:  When the Supreme Court Is No Longer a Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
161, 174–97 (2011).  Indeed, as early as 1990, George Kannar argued that the Court had 
caused damage to numerous areas of the law by its then-recent  
neglect of the Supreme Court’s own traditions and procedures:  its 
sudden and unprincipled self-reversal concerning ‘independent and 
adequate state grounds,’ its unpredictable spasms of ideological haste 
leading to the resolution of important cases before they have been fully 
briefed, its docketing of cases which do not, under governing criteria, 
deserve plenary review. 
George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1354 (1990) 
(footnotes omitted).  Some might also suggest that the discretionary paradigm which 
applies to such an overwhelming percentage of the Court’s workload may bleed into the 
Court’s plenary consideration of the cases selected for decision on the merits, where, for 
example, it sometimes finds “facts” that could not survive further judicial review.  In 
Citizens United v. FEC, for example, Justice Stevens noted that “[t]he majority declares by 
fiat that the appearance of undue influence by high-spending corporations ‘will not cause 
the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.’”  130 S. Ct. 876, 963 n.64 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  As Justice Stevens further noted, however, “The 
electorate itself has consistently indicated otherwise, both in opinion polls and in the laws 
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cases that came within its jurisdiction.  The Court lacked the authority to 
pick and choose its cases or set its own agenda.  As the country grew, 
however, the Court’s caseload became unmanageable.  Congress 
responded in 1891 when it passed the Evarts Act, which created the 
circuit courts of appeals and authorized the Supreme Court to decline to 
hear some cases.10  Further reductions in the Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction followed during the twentieth century.  By the end of that 
century, the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction had virtually disappeared.  
In addition, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Court also 
substantially reduced the number of cases that it chose to hear on 
certiorari each year.  The result is that the Court typically considers 
several thousand petitions for certiorari, but actually decides the merits 
of only about seventy-five cases each Term.11  Thus, measured simply 
according to the total number of cases which the Court “processes” each 
year, an overwhelming percentage of the Court’s work involves cases in 
which discretion, rather than law, controls. 
Given the disproportionately large number of cases that the Court 
“decides” as a matter of discretion, rather than law, it would not be 
surprising if the Justices were to consider recusal issues in that way.  
Indeed, there is considerable evidence to show that the Justices do just 
                                                                                                             
its representatives have passed, and our colleagues have no basis for elevating their own 
optimism into a tenet of constitutional law.”  Id. (citation omitted).  See also Arthur Selwyn 
Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of 
Information to the Justices:  A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975) (analyzing the 
Court’s reliance in merits cases on sources of information distinct from those normally 
identified with the rigors of the adversary process). 
10 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.  Prior to the enactment of the Judiciary Act, 
the Court had succeeded in gaining some practical control over its workload by using a 
deferential standard of review.  See, e.g., Newell v. Norton, 70 U.S. 257, 268 (1865) 
(affirming judgment, without searching review of the record, where there was “ample 
testimony to support the decision”).  In the period following the Civil War, efforts to 
reduce congestion in the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, were complicated by 
political debates over the relative influence of the federal government and the states.  See 
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States—
A Study in the Federal Judicial System, Part II:  From the Civil War to the Federal Courts of 
Appeals Act, 39 HARV. L. REV. 35, 67 (1925) (“Throughout the post-war period the legislative 
history affecting judicial organization is in no small measure a story of strife between those 
who sought to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts and those who aimed merely to 
increase the judicial force to cope with the increase of judicial business.”). 
11 In the final quarter of the twentieth century, the Court reduced the number of cases to 
which it gave plenary consideration each Term from approximately 150 to about 75.  See 
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 738 (2001).  The number of cases on the Court’s plenary docket 
has remained at about that level since then.  See also Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SUP. 
CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited May 18, 2013) (“The 
Court receives approximately 10,000 petitions for writ of certiorari each year.  The Court 
grants and hears oral argument in about 75–80 cases.”). 
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that.  As noted, both the Court’s unwillingness to promulgate standards 
beforehand and the Justices’ refusal to give reasons for their decisions 
after the fact strongly suggest an understanding of the inquiry as 
involving something other than a matter to be decided according to 
law.12  So, too, do the few public pronouncements that the Justices have 
made on the matter, all of which emphasize the so-called “duty to sit,”13 
the “scandal” caused by the mere filing of a motion to recuse,14 and the 
                                                 
12 In June 1981, Justice Powell prepared a characteristically thoughtful and thorough 
memorandum concerning disqualification, apparently in response to criticism that had 
been leveled at him and Justice Stewart.  Significantly, the criticism to which  Justice Powell 
was responding was not that he and Justice Stewart had sat on cases in which they should 
have recused themselves, but that they had recused themselves in an excessive number of 
cases, which recusals the critic (apparently erroneously) attributed to their ownership of 
publicly-traded securities.  See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 274–81 
(1994).  Justice Powell’s memorandum discussed his recusal history and explained that 
most of his recusals were due to professional engagements, rather than stock ownership.  
Background Memorandum on Disqualification from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, 
Supreme Court U.S., to Barrett McGurn, Press Sec’y, Supreme Court U.S. 4–6 (June 15, 
1981) (on file with Powell Archive, Washington and Lee University School of Law Library).  
Significantly, Justice Powell characterized disqualification decisions as often involving 
“personal, subjective judgments.”  Id. at 11.  He may well have been reflecting on his 
personal circumstances.  By 1981, Justice Powell had served nine years on the Court.  Since 
his recusal decisions largely involved his prior client relationships and the client 
relationships of his former firm, he may have thought that recusal decisions should depend 
on such factors as the relative strength of ongoing relationships with the firm, individual 
lawyers in the firm, and particular clients.  While these factors do present complex 
considerations and obviously call for the exercise of judgment (as many legal questions do), 
that does not mean that there is no place for pre-announced rules, or that recusal decisions 
ultimately can be resolved only by “personal, subjective judgments.”  Justice Powell also 
argued against the public disclosure of a Justice’s reasons for recusal decisions, noting that 
“public disclosure often would be embarrassing to other persons, and also would invite 
inquiries as to why there is disqualification in one case and not in another.”  Id.  Justice 
Powell further provided that his memorandum could be shown to “any reporter who is 
assigned regularly to cover the Court,” but not to anyone else, and to those regularly 
assigned to cover the Court only on the condition that it be treated as background material 
and “not [subject to] publication in whole or in part.”  Id. at 2.  Finally, Justice Powell stated 
in the memorandum that he was “willing to advise a reporter [who regularly covers the 
Court] individually—as background information—why I disqualify in a particular case 
provided that the number of requests does not prove too burdensome.”  Id. at 11–12. 
13 See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 (2004) (Scalia, J.); Laird v. 
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.); JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END 
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/ 
TheThirdBranch/12-01-01/2011_Year-End_Report_on_the_Federal_Judiciary.aspx. 
14 Avoiding what some religious groups call “scandal” (allegedly undermining 
confidence in a particular religious organization by acknowledging the faults of its 
members) is frequently given as a reason for disapproving transparency.  See, e.g., Ollivier 
Hubert, Ritual Performance and Parish Sociability:  French-Canadian Catholic Families at Mass 
from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century, in HOUSEHOLDS OF FAITH:  FAMILY, GENDER, 
AND COMMUNITY IN CANADA, 1706–1969, 64 (Nancy Christie ed., 2002) (explaining that, in 
the Church’s view, “knowledge of sin was itself an occasion of sin”).  In his statement in 
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priority apparently accorded to having every case decided by an odd-
numbered, full complement of Justices, rather than by a smaller number 
of Justices whose impartiality is beyond dispute.15  Finally, there is the 
distinction made by the reporter of decisions between cases in which the 
reporter states that “Justice X took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case” and those in which the reporter states that “Justice 
X took no part in the decision of this case.”  The former phrase signifies 
that the Justice did not participate in oral argument, or in the conference 
discussion of the case, or in any post-conference epistolary exchange, or 
other consideration of the case.  The latter phrase means something far 
less, namely, that the recusal came at some point prior to the 
announcement of the judgment of the Court.  The recusing Justice may 
have taken part (and may even have played a dominant role) in oral 
argument and in conference, and may have fully participated in the 
exchange of draft opinions before recusing.16 That may be because the 
                                                                                                             
Cheney, Justice Scalia argued that the press was undermining public confidence in the 
Court by raising issues relating to his extra curial activities: 
While the political branches can perhaps survive the constant baseless 
allegations of impropriety that have become the staple of Washington 
reportage, this Court cannot.  The people must have confidence in the 
integrity of the Justices, and that cannot exist in a system that assumes 
them to be corruptible by the slightest friendship or favor, and in an 
atmosphere where the press will be eager to find foot-faults. 
541 U.S. at 928.  Justice Scalia seemingly suggests that it would be best for the public not to 
know about conduct that the Justices themselves consider to be mere “foot-faults.”  Under 
our form of government, however, the public is entitled to know and comment on the 
conduct of public officials, and no branch of government is thought to be beyond public 
scrutiny or criticism.  See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (applying the First 
Amendment malice requirement of N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) to 
criticism of judges); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case:  A Note on “The Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 205 (1964) (discussing seditious 
libel and criticism of government officials). 
15 Chief Justice Rehnquist has made the point in Laird v. Tatum and in Microsoft Corp. v. 
United States.  See Microsoft Corp. v. U.S., 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (“[T]he even number of 
[Justices] remaining [after one Justice’s recusal] creates a risk of affirmance of a lower court 
decision by an equally divided court.”); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837–38 (1972) (“[T]he 
disqualification of one Justice of this Court raises the possibility of an affirmance of the 
judgment below by an equally divided Court.”).  Justice Scalia has made the point in 
Cheney v. United States District Court, and Chief Justice Roberts made the same point in his 
2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary.  Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915–16 (“Even one 
unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the Court.”); ROBERTS, supra note 13. 
16 Recusals may also occur at the petition stage, but the sheer volume of petitions to be 
considered has sometimes made it difficult for a Justice to identify all of the cases in which 
he or she should recuse at that stage.  Justice Powell’s papers reflect several instances in 
which one or another of the Justices expressed his views on whether certiorari should be 
granted and subsequently recused.  See, e.g., Docket Sheet of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. 
Justice, Supreme Court U.S. at 8, City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702 (1978) (No. 76-1810) (on file with Powell Archive, Washington and Lee University 
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Justice was unaware of a potential conflict until late in his or her 
consideration of the case, or the conflict may not have existed until that 
time.   
But there is another possible explanation as well.  We know from the 
papers of the Justices that some of them have waited, on occasion, to 
decide whether to recuse until after they knew the probable outcome of a 
case.  Even some of the most conscientious Justices have sometimes 
followed that course.17  Such a course of action would seem to suggest 
                                                                                                             
School of Law), available at http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/76-
1810_CityOfLAManhart.pdf (“Brennan thinks this conflicts with Equal Pay Act and 
probably Title VII.”); Docket Sheet of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court 
U.S. at 8, U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (No. 76-1151) (on file with Powell Archive, 
Washington and Lee University School of Law), available at http://law.wlu.edu/ 
deptimages/powell%20archives/Ceccolini.pdf (“Harry [Blackmun] thinks case presents 
good opportunity to ‘put exclusionary rule in focus.’”).  Since 1980, however, the Rules of 
the Supreme Court have specifically required more detailed disclosures concerning the 
identities of the parties and their affiliates, presumably to assist the Justices in making 
informed decisions relating to recusals at the petition stage.  See SUP. CT. R. 14, 29.6; see also 
Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court’s 1980 Rules—The First Addendum, 
87 F.R.D. 513 (1980) (explaining the 1980 rule change requiring additional information 
concerning parent companies, non-wholly-owned subsidiaries, and affiliated companies).  
In addition, the Rules of the Supreme Court now require that amicus curiae briefs fully 
describe the party on whose behalf the brief is being filed and also disclose “whether 
counsel for a party has authored the brief in whole or in part and whether such counsel or a 
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the 
brief, and shall identify every person, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its 
counsel, who made such a monetary contribution.”  SUP. CT. R. 37.6. 
17 For example, in EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590 (1981), Justice Powell 
participated in the oral argument and conference, but later recused because his former law 
firm had been involved in the case in the lower courts.  Justice Powell’s conference notes 
suggest that he made his recusal decision after he determined that his vote would make no 
difference because a clear majority of the Court would vote to reverse.  See Conference 
Notes of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court U.S. at 19, EEOC v. Associated 
Dry Goods, 449 U.S. 590 (1981) (No. 79-1068) (on file with Powell Archive, Washington and 
Lee University School of Law), available at http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell% 
20archives/79-1068_EEOCAssociated%20Dry%20Goods.pdf (in the spirit of full disclosure, 
the author notes that he was one of the attorneys for the EEOC in this case).  Of course, it is 
not possible to reconstruct the thinking that led Justice Powell to reach the decision he did 
at the time that he reached it.  However, his apparent indecision might have been the result 
of such factors as the length of time that had elapsed since he had practiced law with the 
firm, the possibility that the party was not a client of the firm at the time he was a partner, 
the possibility that he did not have a close personal relationship with the firm lawyers who 
had represented the client in the lower courts, and the fact the client had decided not to 
continue to retain his firm in the Supreme Court phase of the litigation, although the 
client’s decision to terminate the engagement might have been made for a variety of 
reasons, ranging from questions of cost and expertise to speculation about Justice Powell’s 
likely view of the merits and tactical concerns about minimizing the likelihood of his 
recusal.  Other case files demonstrate the extent to which Justice Powell struggled with 
recusal decisions, particularly as time passed and his connections with his former law firm 
and its clients presumably became more remote.  As early as 1975, however, Justice Powell 
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that the Justice was genuinely undecided about the need for recusal, 
based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and his or her 
relationship to counsel or the parties.  Once it became clear that the 
Justice’s vote would not affect the outcome, the difficulty simply 
disappeared.  Presumably, the Justice would have been confronted with 
a more difficult decision if his or her vote had mattered; and those, of 
course, are the cases with which we should be particularly concerned.  
Like most legal questions, recusal motions require the application of 
legal judgment, but they cannot properly be classified as discretionary 
matters in the way that petitions for certiorari are.  A litigant may have 
no right to Supreme Court review, but she does have the right to an 
impartial decision-maker, both in connection with the decision to grant 
or deny certiorari, and, if certiorari is granted, in connection with the 
rendering of a decision on the merits.  Just as there is no recognized 
exception to the hearsay rule for “really important hearsay,” there can be 
no exception to the requirement of judicial impartiality based on the fact 
that a particular Justice believes that he or she has a unique perspective 
and contribution to make to the decision of a case, even if his or her 
colleagues agree that the Justice’s participation is desirable or “really 
needed.”  What is at stake, of course, is the litigants’ right to an impartial 
decision-maker.  
The Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld the constitutional right to 
an impartial decision-maker.  Most recently, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Company, the Court held that a state court judge’s failure to recuse in 
a case involving a major campaign contributor violated the due process 
clause.18  In Caperton, the Court noted that the scope of the due process 
                                                                                                             
wondered about how long he should continue to recuse in cases involving his former firm.  
In Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), for example, Justice Powell decided to recuse after 
hearing oral argument in the case, but he noted in a memorandum to the Chief Justice that 
“[t]he doctrine of ‘remoteness’ must come into play at some point.”  Memorandum from 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court U.S., to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, 
Supreme Court U.S. at 23 (Jan. 23, 1975), Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (No. 73-1742) 
Case File (on file with Powell Archive, Washington and Lee University School of Law), 
available at http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/73-1742_TrainNatural% 
20Resouces.pdf.  Significantly, Justice Powell further noted that he “continue[d] to be 
puzzled as to how long one should stay out of cases such as these.”  Id. at 24.  Justice 
Powell also recused in NLRB v. Sears.  421 U.S. 132 (1975). In a hand-written annotation 
contained in that case file, Justice Powell noted, “I stay out of Sears cases . . . this Term and 
reexamine my position next Term.”  Preliminary Memorandum from Robert I. Richter, Law 
Clerk, Supreme Court U.S., to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court U.S. at 1 
(April 1, 1974), NLRB v. Sears, 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (No.73-1233) (on file with Powell 
Archive, Washington and Lee University School of Law), available at http://law.wlu.edu/ 
deptimages/powell%20archives/73-1233_NLRBSears.pdf.  Clearly, some bright-line rules 
would have made Justice Powell’s decision-making process less burdensome.  
18 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009). 
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clause is not limited in this context to requiring recusal only in those 
circumstances in which recusal would have been required at common 
law.  The Caperton Court observed, “As new problems have emerged . . . 
the Court has identified additional instances which, as an objective 
matter, require recusal.  These are circumstances ‘in which experience 
teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’”19  In such 
circumstances, the question is “not whether the judge is actually, 
subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is 
‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential 
for bias.’”20 
It is difficult to imagine how the constitutional right discussed in 
Caperton could be trumped by the arguments from judicial convenience 
put forth by the Chief Justice and other members of the Court.  It is 
obviously desirable, for example, for decisions to be made by all 
qualified members of a collegial body, whether that body be the Court or 
the Congress, but the desirability of full participation cannot justify the 
inclusion of persons who are otherwise disqualified from serving. 
Moreover, there is no logical or constitutional necessity for having a 
particular case decided by an odd number of Justices.  As Professor 
Lubet has noted, the Justices may find it easier to do their work with an 
odd number, but the judicial power does not extend to setting the 
number of Justices.  Congress has that power, and it has sometimes 
chosen to set the full complement of Justices at six or eight or ten.  As 
Professor Lubet has also pointed out, the number of possible recusals is 
not likely to be great in any event, and the number of cases in which a 
recusal might affect the outcome would be even smaller.21  That is 
undoubtedly correct.  In addition to the reasons given by Professor 
Lubet, I would point out that such motions always entail costs to the 
movants and their lawyers—not simply in terms of out-of-pocket 
expense, but also because of the way in which members of the Court 
may view such motions and those who make them.  A proper 
                                                 
19 Id. at 2259 (citation omitted). 
20 Id. at 2262.  In Caperton, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia dissented in terms 
quite consistent with the views on recusal that they have otherwise expressed.  Id. at 2274 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  According to Justice Scalia, for example, the public risks losing 
confidence in the judiciary not because of the judiciary’s actions, but because of the 
insistence of lawyers and their clients that the judiciary be held to a high standard, which 
Justice Scalia brushes aside as simply strategic behavior by lawyers and clients.  Id. (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); see also Lincoln Caplan, Justice for Sale:  How Big Money Is Overwhelming 
Judicial Elections and Corroding Our Confidence in the Courts, AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 2012, at 
20 (discussing the impact of Citizens United and Caperton on state judicial elections). 
21 Lubet, supra note 2, at 900–02.   
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understanding of those costs will likely discourage parties and their 
lawyers from urging recusal unless there is a solid basis for doing so.22   
In addition, the Court’s ostensible concerns about the possibility of 
non-full-strength decisions, as well as the possibility of cases ending in 
deadlock, seem overblown.  After all, if conflicts are dealt with at an 
early stage, the Court could simply deny certiorari when one of the 
Justices is recused.  That would avoid the waste of resources involved in 
litigating a Supreme Court case that is destined to produce an evenly-
split decision.  That might seem to be strong medicine, but the possible 
disruption to the administration of justice might not be as serious as it 
might initially appear.  The Court seldom grants certiorari to decide an 
issue that is unique to one case, and there normally are other cases 
raising the same issue waiting in the wings.23  Moreover, the reasons for 
a Justice’s recusal are likely to be case-specific and will not affect his or 
her participation in a subsequent case.  As Professor Lubet suggests, 
however, few cases are likely to result in an evenly-split decision, and 
scarce resources are not likely to be wasted for that reason.  Thus, it 
might be better in most cases for the Court to go ahead and hear the case.  
Even if the Court were to split evenly in the end, the issue would remain 
available for decision in another case.  Finally, if these concerns are so 
serious, why did the Court grant certiorari in Fisher v. University of Texas 
                                                 
22 Numerous commentators, including then-Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., have noted that 
Supreme Court cases have increasingly been argued by a smaller number of experienced 
Supreme Court advocates in recent years. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-
emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. S. CT. HIST. 68 (2005).  When lawyers appear 
repeatedly before a court, they are not likely to jeopardize their credibility by filing ill-
founded motions, particularly recusal motions.  Nor are clients likely to insist on filing an 
ill-founded recusal motion when they have been properly counseled by experienced 
Supreme Court advocates.  Like their lawyers, clients have nothing to gain, and much to 
lose, by filing an unfounded recusal motion.  Of course, greater transparency would be 
helpful in determining whether there is a solid basis for seeking recusal.  I should note, 
however, that my argument assumes that only the actual parties to the case would have 
standing to move for the recusal of a Justice.  I would not favor extending the right to amici 
curiae or somehow giving formal recognition to extra curial “suggestions.”  On the other 
hand, a Justice should always be free to decide to recuse sua sponte. 
23 See Barry Sullivan, Essay Review of ‘Supreme Court Practice’, R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. 
Shapiro, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 452, 454 (1987). 
New Supreme Court decisions and new legislation beget further 
unresolved constitutional and legal questions that begin to be litigated 
in various courts throughout the country, and then work their way up 
through the system.  Because many cases are proceeding to the 
Supreme Court at various speeds along parallel tracks, timing is 
important. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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at Austin,24 potentially one of the most important cases of the current 
Term, despite Justice Kagan’s recusal? 
If one takes Caperton seriously, it seems clear that the due process 
clause requires that standards be announced and reasons be given.  Of 
course, there is no constitutional requirement that standards be 
announced in a code of ethics rather than in case law, but here we have 
neither.  What we have is “secret law,” and that clearly does not comport 
with due process.  If I am correct, however, in thinking that we are not 
likely to see any substantial increase in the number of recusal motions, 
we can also assume that we will not see a large number of recusal 
decisions emanating from the Supreme Court, even if the Justices begin 
writing opinions on recusal motions.  Thus, it seems preferable to have 
the Court promulgate a code of conduct for itself, rather than relying 
entirely on case law development.  Of course, a code of conduct would 
be preferable for the additional reason that subjects in addition to recusal 
could be covered in such a code. 
II. 
As I noted at the beginning, I have two reservations.  The first 
concerns the appropriate role for Congress to take in this area, while the 
second involves the wisdom of relying on en banc review of recusal 
motions.  I will deal with them briefly in that order. 
First, the duty to recuse is set forth in § 455 of Title 28, which 
enumerates certain reasons warranting recusal and purports to apply to 
all federal judges, including the Justices of the Supreme Court.  The 
Chief Justice has somewhat ominously observed, “As in the case of 
financial reporting and gift requirements, the limits of Congress’s power 
to require recusal have never been tested,” but he also has been quick to 
add that the Justices have actually followed “the same general principles 
respecting recusal as other federal judges.”25  Moreover, as Professor 
Lubet has wisely observed, “[I]t is all but inconceivable that any Chief 
Justice would simply ignore ethics legislation, whether it had been 
‘tested’ or not.”26  Although the Supreme Court would necessarily have 
the last word on whether § 455 is constitutional (and at least one scholar, 
Louis J. Virelli, III, has opined that the section is unconstitutional as 
applied),27 it seems unlikely that a majority of the Justices would want to 
                                                 
24 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
1536 (Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345) (mem.). 
25 ROBERTS, supra note 13, at 7. 
26 Lubet, supra note 2, at 903.  
27 Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1185 (2011). 
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provoke a constitutional stand-off over the question whether Congress 
has the right to insist that the Justices act with the same degree of probity 
as other federal judges. 
It seems, therefore, that the Justices, if left alone, will continue to 
adhere to § 455 in their own way and according to their own lights, 
whatever they think of its constitutionality.  But how would the Justices 
respond to new ethics legislation, such as H.R. 862?  Here, it may be 
important to consider a point that Professor Virelli makes in the 
conclusion to his article, where he seemingly limits his argument as to 
unconstitutionality with the observation that “[c]onstitutional text, 
history, practice, and structure all suggest that the Court, rather than 
Congress, should be the sole arbiter of its substantive recusal 
standards.”28 
Of course, H.R. 862 would meet Professor Virelli’s criterion for 
unconstitutionality:  it imposes substantive recusal standards by 
requiring that the Justices adopt a specific code of conduct, namely, the 
code that the Judicial Conference has promulgated to govern lower 
federal court judges.  If Professor Virelli is correct, H.R. 862 would be 
constitutionally problematic, and the Justices would be on firm ground if 
they simply ignored it.  Whether they actually would do so is another 
question.  They might still be reluctant to make legislation of this kind 
into an occasion for a show-down with the political branches.  On the 
other hand, they might well consider such legislation as veering too far 
into their territory to be ignored. But what if Congress simply required 
the Justices to promulgate a comprehensive, integrated code of conduct 
to guide their decision-making in this area, without requiring them to 
adopt the Judicial Conference’s code of conduct or any other specific 
code?  That legislation would not constitute the imposition of any 
“substantive recusal standards”; nor would it be unlike a myriad of other 
regulations that Congress regularly and constitutionally enacts to 
regulate the work of the federal judiciary, including the Supreme 
Court.29  By the same token, Congress could also impose on the Justices a 
legal obligation to give reasons for their recusal decisions.  Those reforms 
                                                 
28 Id. at 1233 (emphasis added). 
29 Congress exercises extensive authority with respect to the Supreme Court.  For 
example, Congress defines the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, establishes the number of 
Justices to sit on the Court, and sets the compensation of the Justices.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 
1253–54 (2006).  David Stras and Ryan Scott have recently suggested that Congress 
properly could attempt to influence the Justices’ retirement decisions by increasing the 
Court’s workload as well as providing for more generous retirement compensation.  See 
David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1419 
(2006).  See generally David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure:  The Case for a 
“Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1397 (2005). 
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would go a long way towards solving the problem without raising 
colorable constitutional issues that members of the Court could use to 
deflect attention from the substantive problem.  Indeed, if the Court 
wanted to object to the new regulations, it would have to begin by 
objecting to § 455, which it has not previously been willing to do.  These 
are steps that the Court should take, whether or not it is required to do 
so by legislation.30 
Second, I have reservations concerning the wisdom and feasibility of 
en banc review.  On the one hand, I do not think it inconceivable that en 
banc consideration of recusal motions might strain collegiality in a court 
already well-known for its polarization and sometime lack of civility.31  I 
also think that en banc consideration of recusal motions may provide 
some possibility for strategic alignments among the Justices, perhaps not 
with a view towards changing outcomes—(Professor Lubet has 
persuaded me that this is mathematically impossible, assuming majority 
voting in connection with recusals)—but perhaps for other purposes, 
such as silencing what might be anticipated as a forceful dissent on 
plenary review.32  But I think both probabilities are remote. 
My main concern comes from the opposite direction.  Given the 
Justices’ apparently longstanding reluctance to treat recusal issues in a 
way that comports with ordinary judicial practice, it seems unlikely to 
me that they will now change course to the extent of taking up the 
additional responsibility of policing each other’s ethical practices, at least 
                                                 
30 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his statement on recusal in the Microsoft case that he 
had consulted with his colleagues before denying the motion.  See Microsoft Corp. v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.) (mem.).  According to Ross Davies, 
other Justices do so as well.  Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants:  Two Parables of 
Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 79, 91 (2006).  While consultation is 
certainly a salutary practice, it is not an adequate substitute for pre-announced standards 
and fully articulated reasons. 
31 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 
U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 386, 399–400 (2000) (expressing concern about Justice Scalia’s rhetoric 
and the example it sets for law students and lawyers as to what counts for acceptable legal 
discourse). 
32 While the Supreme Court originally followed the practice of delivering seriatim 
opinions, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized consensus, a practice which was in turn 
abandoned.  See generally M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again:  A 
Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283 (2007).  According to Justice Brennan, 
[S]ome contend that the dissent is . . . a “cloud” on the majority 
decision that detracts from the legitimacy that the law requires and 
from the prestige of the institution that issues the law.  Learned Hand 
complained that a dissenting opinion “cancels the impact of monolithic 
solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely 
depends.” 
William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 429 (1986) (quoting 
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958)). 
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in the sense of passing judgment on each other’s recusal motions.  In this 
respect, the main danger seems to be that opinions will be issued which 
appear, as a formal matter, to be opinions of the Court, but effectively 
represent the work product of only the Justice whose recusal is 
requested, with little or no independent review by the other Justices.  If 
social science studies are to be credited, most Justices are not likely to 
participate fully in the decision of recusal motions aimed at a colleague’s 
participation in a case, but will be inclined to defer to the colleague’s 
decision.33  “Going-along” decision-making, as Judge Richard A. Posner 
and others have called it, is a well-known phenomenon in the general 
conduct of multi-judge judicial panels.34  Moreover, the reluctance to rule 
against a judicial (or quasi-judicial) colleague in the recusal context has 
been confirmed by studies of the recusal voting behavior of arbitrators; 
those studies suggest that the making of recusal motions to be decided 
by two members of a three-person arbitration panel is almost always 
futile because the two non-challenged arbitrators are generally disposed 
not to find that their colleague should be disqualified.35 
It seems unlikely that the Justices will suddenly become interested in 
each other’s recusal motions and treat them as if they were merits cases.  
Decisions on recusal motions most likely would come to be single-Justice 
opinions dressed up as opinions of the Court.  If I am right about that, en 
banc consideration will give the illusion of collegial decision-making and 
an aura of authority and regularity that the opinions will not warrant.  
                                                 
33 Not surprisingly, social science studies suggest a reduced level of conflict where 
participants anticipate future interactions and transactions.  See, e.g., Jacob M. Rabbie, 
Determinants of Instrumental Intra-Group Cooperation, in COOPERATION AND PROSOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 238, 239 (Robert A. Hinde & Jo Groebel eds., 1991) (discussing studies which 
suggest that selfish behavior of group members is reduced when members’ contributions 
can be personally identified); Scott T. Wolf, Taya R. Cohen, Jeffrey L. Kirchner, Andrew 
Rea, R. Matthew Montoya & Chester A. Insko, Reducing Intergroup Conflict Through the 
Consideration of Future Consequences, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 831, 839 (2009) (discussing 
studies which suggest a reduction in intergroup conflict when groups consider future 
consequences). 
34 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 22 (1993).  During his Supreme Court 
confirmation hearing, Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. attempted to explain his purchase 
of stock in a company during the pendency of a case in which the company was a party, 
and he was a non-writing judge, by explaining that he generally considered his work to be 
finished once the impression vote had been taken and the opinion assigned to someone 
else.  Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
271 (1969) (testimony of the Hon. Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., Nominee to be Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/law/find/nominations/haynsworth/hearing.pdf.  
35 Margaret L. Moses, Reasoned Decisions in Arbitrator Challenges, in VOLUME III OF THE 
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 199 (2013). 
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The diffusion of responsibility will also preclude the kind of 
accountability that would be possible if the individual Justice whose 
recusal is sought were simply required to give written reasons, which 
could then be subject to appropriate public and professional criticism.36 
But there is another aspect to the problem that also counsels against 
en banc review as a solution to the recusal problem.  In many cases, the 
individual Justice must consider the possibility of recusal not because a 
motion has been made, but because of facts that the Justice knows to be 
true.  It may be that the facts which counsel in favor of recusal are not 
known to the putative movant; alternatively, the putative movant may 
know the relevant facts but choose to refrain from filing a motion, 
because he believes that that course of action is unlikely to produce any 
result other than a negative reaction from the Justice who should recuse.  
Where no motion has been made, therefore, everything depends on the 
attitude of the Justice who should recuse.  Cultivating among the Justices 
a real sense of individual responsibility, and an individual receptiveness 
to taking the question of recusal seriously in every case, is essential if 
issues of recusal are to receive the consideration they deserve.  There is 
no reason to believe that en banc consideration will necessarily further 
that goal. 
The most that can be expected, I think, is that some Justices, if 
required to write opinions to justify their own recusal decisions, will take 
the task seriously and thereby raise the bar for all the Justices.  Absent en 
banc consideration, there will not be peer review, of course, in an 
individual case, but I think that meaningful peer review is unlikely to 
occur in an individual case in any event.  On the other hand, a body of 
case law will develop and be discussed and evaluated by the Justices 
themselves, as well as by the practicing bar, academic lawyers, and the 
public.  Indeed, it was a fear of putting that very kind of pressure on 
other members of the Court that Justice Rehnquist once gave as the 
reason for not publishing his recusal opinions:  “I have simply thought it 
best not to publicly announce a reason, because it might well be a reason 
with which some of my colleagues would agree and some would not.”37  
Moreover, according to Justice Powell’s biographer, “[O]ne of the few 
criticisms Rehnquist ever made of Powell was that he was ‘a little overly 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice:  Justice Scalia’s Memorandum in the 
Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229, 229 (2004) (calling Justice Scalia’s recusal opinion 
“disappointing and disingenuous”). 
37 Letter from Justice William Rehnquist to THE DES MOINES REGISTER (Dec. 15, 1981), in 
The Justices Answer, THE DES MOINES REGISTER, Dec. 15, 1991, at 6A, quoted in JEFFRIES, supra 
note 12, at 276. 
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fastidious about disqualification,’ which put pressure on his colleagues 
to conform to his extremely conservative standard.”38 
I recognize that there are powerful arguments on the other side, 
most importantly, the inability of individuals to be totally impartial in 
assessing their own impartiality, which is a point that Professor Lubet 
and others have made.39  I also recognize that en banc consideration of 
recusals is the norm in some states, as Professor Lubet notes, as well as in 
some foreign courts of last resort.40  This is obviously a close question.  
Given the tradition and culture of our Supreme Court, however, I doubt 
that en banc review would necessarily lead to better recusal results than 
might be possible under some other reform schemes. 
III. 
In sum, the Supreme Court needs to adopt a code of ethics and a 
better system for handling recusals.  Above all, the Court needs to begin 
treating recusals seriously, as matters involving legal and constitutional 
rights, rather than as matters calling for the simple exercise of judicial 
discretion.  The Justices need to articulate standards and give reasons for 
their decisions, if they are to act, and to be perceived as acting, in the 
way in which courts normally are thought and expected to act.  
Otherwise, as one great judge said about other judges in other 
circumstances, the Justices risk acting like good King Louis: 
The good French king used to sit under a spreading oak 
tree, not presiding even-handedly as a judge at a trial, 
but dispensing justice subjectively, arbitrarily, hit-or-
miss, according to his fancy of the moment as to what 
was best for his subjects and when it was best for him to 
tell them about it.41 
                                                 
38 JEFFRIES, supra note 12, at 276 n.*. 
39 See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?:  Recusal and the Procedural 
Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 107 n.1 (2004). 
40 See, e.g., R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse?  Foreign Common Law Guidance 
& Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1828 (2005). 
41 United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 106 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., dissenting); see 
also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia & Kennedy, J.J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“The doctrine of stare decisis protects the legitimate 
expectations of those who live under the law, and, as Alexander Hamilton observed [in 
Federalist 78], is one of the means by which exercise of ‘an arbitrary discretion in the 
courts’ is restrained.” (citation omitted)).  The requirement that judges give reasons for 
their decisions is another. 
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